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Abstract: In this paper we present an idea of trusted 
communication platform for Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) called 
TrustMAS. Based on analysis of routing protocols suitable for 
MAS we have designed a new proactive hidden routing. Proposed 
steg-agents discovery procedure, as well as further routes updates 
and hidden communication, are cryptographically independent. 
Steganographic exchange can cover heterogeneous and 
geographically outlying environments using available cross-layer 
covert channels. Finally we have specified rules that agents have to 
follow to benefit the TrustMAS distributed router platform. 
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1. Introduction 
Decentralization of the operations was recognized as a valid 
paradigm in the early 1960’s. It was confirmed to be robust 
and efficient and it was used as a fundament in creating 
architecture for such breaking ideas like Internet and grid 
computing. Nowadays we are witnessing expansion of 
distributed systems and services ahead with for example 
peer-to-peer overlays [1]. Today the most promising 
application of the distributed operations are agents ([19], 
[22]). History of the agents tracks back to distributed 
artificial intelligence (DAI) and distributed problem solving 
(DPS) concepts [19]. We can define them as the independent 
software components that are able to act autonomously and 
which can represent another entity (e.g. human). Moreover 
systems that consist of many agents interacting with each 
other form MAS [41].  
Combining MAS platforms with steganographic 
techniques enables secure and unrestricted hidden 
communication among trusted multi-agent population and it 
is a novel contribution of the TrustMAS. In our research we 
were focused on providing trusted communication between 
chosen agents using steganographic channels. In this way 
distributed steganographic router is formed. 
2. Backgrounds 
2.1 Agents and trust in MAS 
Agents can be generally classified as stationary or mobile 
agents. The main difference between both types is that 
stationary agent resides only on a single platform (host that 
agent operates on) and mobile one is able to migrate from 
one host to another while preserving its data and state. 
Agents can be characterized with the following properties 
[8]: 
• Interaction - by performing actions agents influence the 
environment they operate in, 
• Flexibility - that can be defined as an ability of the agents 
to be responsive to the changes occurring in its 
environment and to interact with other agents (social 
property) to achieve common goal (proactive property) 
[22], 
• Autonomy - no direct intervention of humans (or other 
entities) is needed for agents to act. 
The main advantages of the systems that utilize agents 
include: fault tolerance (as it is harder for intruder to 
interrupt communication when it is distributed), scalability 
and flexibility, performance improvements, lightweight 
design and an ability to be assigned to different tasks to 
perform. The most common applications of MAS varies from 
network monitoring (e.g. IDS/IPS systems [21]) and 
management, information filtering and gathering (e.g. 
Google), building self healing, high scalable networks or 
protection system [42] to transportation, logistics and other 
(e.g. graphic computer games development [43]). 
MAS systems are implemented based on platforms which 
are the tools to build multi-agent systems. Nowadays the 
most popular platforms include: JADE [52], AgentBuilder 
[53], JACK [54], MadKit [55] and Zeus [56]. Such tools 
simplifies the implementation of multi-agent systems. 
Providing security for MAS is crucial as nowadays this 
technology’s global scale development is still limited by 
security constrains and vulnerabilities ([23], [4], [16], [33], 
[20]). Classical security model based on central, well secured 
bastion paradigm is no longer sufficient, because in new 
distributed network environment agents are ideal attack 
targets for any malicious operations. Moreover the agents, 
themselves, are prefect attack tools. The most important 
attacks that can be performed using MAS include: spamming, 
DoS (Denial of Service) and spoofing ([16], [21]).  
On the other hand mobile agents create dynamic 
environment and have to be able to establish ad-hoc trust 
relations to perform intended tasks collectively and 
effectively. Particularly challenging goals are authentication 
process where an identity of agent may be unknown and 
authorization decisions where a policy should accommodate 
to distributed and changing structure. Trusted cooperation in 
heterogeneous MAS environment requires not only trust 
establishment but also monitoring and adjusting existing 
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relations.  
Main two concepts of the trust establishment in a 
distributed environment ([28], [27], [31]) are a reputation 
based ([12], [26], [2], [36], [34]) and a credential (or rule) 
based trust management (TM) ([5], [6], [11], [39], [20], 
[40]). The first one utilizes information aggregated by system 
entities to evaluate reputation of chosen entity. Basically, 
decisions are made according to recommendations from other 
entities where some of them can be better than others. An 
example of the reputation computation system can be 
influential PageRank developed by Google. The second 
solution – the credential based TM – utilizes secure (e.g. 
cryptographically signed) statements about a chosen entity. 
Well known credential based platform is Public Key 
Infrastructure where role of credentials fulfill X.509 
certificates. Essential in reputation evaluation is a presence of 
a risk factor. These flexible solutions do not exclude wrong 
decisions. Credential based decisions are more reliable but 
require well defined semantics.  
 
2.2 Steganography 
Information hiding techniques such as network, audio, image 
and text steganography, can became a powerful tool that can 
be used to establish secure and stealth communication ([18], 
[25], [38], [32], [3], [24], [35]) among trusted agents.  Most 
of contemporary, widely available implementations of 
steganographic systems are dedicated to the multimedia 
applications – hidden data is distributed in sound files, 
images and movies. A focus on a content exchange in 
application layer of network model (e.g. watermarking as an 
intellectual property rights protection tool) can be observed. 
Steganographic solutions located in network protocols are 
not relatively widespread, but they exist – most of them rely 
on usage of communication protocol’s optional fields or 
untypical values from correction codes space. 
For MAS environment we propose a distributed 
steganographic router which will provide ability to create the 
covert channels between chosen agents. Paths between agents 
can be built with the use of any of the steganographic 
methods in any OSI RM layer and be adjusted to the 
heterogeneous characteristics of a given network. The 
concept of a steganographic router, as stated earlier, is new in 
the steganography state of the art and also MAS technology 
seems to be very accurate to implement such router in this 
environment. To develop safe and a far-reaching agent 
communication platform it is required to enhance routing 
process with anonymity. The first concept of network 
anonymity was introduced in the seminal paper of Chaum 
[10]. System Mixnet proposed there has become a foundation 
of modern anonymity systems. The concept of Mixnet 
chaining with encryption has been used in a wide range of 
applications such as E-mail ([30],[13]), Web browsing [18], 
ISDN [33], and general IP traffic anonymization (Freedom 
[17], TOR [29]). Other solutions [9] seem to play a less 
important role or, as Crowds [47], can be considered as 
simplifications of Mixnet. By means of forwarding traffic for 
others it is possible to provide agents’ untraceability. The 
origin of collaboration intent in this manner can be hidden 
from untrusted agents and eavesdroppers. 
 
2.3 Routing in TrustMAS 
Routing protocols in IP networks are changing, as the 
networks evolved, from distance-vector (e.g. Routing 
Information Protocol (RIP), Interior Gateway Routing 
Protocol (IGRP)), link-state (e.g. Open Shortest Path First 
(OSPF)) and hybrid (e.g. Enhanced Interior Gateway Routing 
Protocol (EIGRP)) protocols for wired networks to proactive 
(e.g. Destination-Sequenced Distance Vector (DSDV), 
Wireless Routing Protocol (WRP), Global State Routing 
(GSR), Optimized Link State Routing (OLSR)), reactive (e.g. 
Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV), Dynamic 
Source Routing (DSR), Light-weight Mobile Routing 
(LMR)) and hybrid (e.g. Zone Routing Protocol (ZRP), 
Scalable Location Update Routing Protocol (SLURP), 
Distributed Dynamic Routing (DDR)) protocols for 
MANETs [50], [51]. 
In TrustMAS the most important component that proposed 
distributed steganographic router must posses is routing 
protocol. The effective routing protocol is vital for agents’ 
communication and their performance. The routing protocol 
that will be developed for TrustMAS must take into account 
all specific features that are not to find in any other routing 
environment. That includes: providing anonymity with 
random walk algorithm and usage of steganographic 
methods. Both those aspects affect performance of the 
routing convergence. The first one influences updates: due to 
provide anonymity service they must be periodic. The second 
one affects links’ available bandwidth.  
That is why the routing protocol for TrustMAS will be 
designed from the scratch, will be kept as simple as possible 
so non of the existing routing protocols for MANETs are 
applicable. It will be a distance vector proactive algorithm 
(and will be described in details in section 4). 
3. Architecture and main components of 
TrustMAS 
3.1 Agents in TrustMAS: Steganographic Agents 
(SAs) and Ordinary Agents (OAs) 
Two types of agents are present in TrustMAS platform. 
There are Ordinary Agents (OAs) that uses this platform to 
benefit from two security services that it provides: trust and 
anonymity. The second type of agents are Steganographic 
Agents (StegAgents, SAs) that use TrustMAS to perform 
hidden communication. The OAs are not aware of the 
presence of SAs. And even if malicious agents exist and try 
to uncover SAs and their communication, there are certain 
mechanisms available in TrustMAS (described later) to limit 
potential risk of disclosure. Each StegAgent is characterized 
with its address and steg-capabilities that describe the 
steganographic techniques that SA can use to create hidden 
channel to communicate with other SAs. 
In TrustMAS, StegAgents may perform steganographic 
communication in various ways, especially by using methods 
in different layers of TCP/IP model. In particular, SAs may 
utilize other than application layer methods by using 
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specialized middleware enabling steganography through all 
layers in this model. In some cases there is a possibility to 
use only application layer steganography i.e. image or audio 
hiding methods. Hidden communication via middleware in 
different layers gives opportunity for SAs to establish links 
outside MAS platform. Examples of techniques in different 
layers of TCP/IP model that enable covert channels includes: 
• Application layer e.g. audio, video, still images, text 
hiding methods, 
• Transport and network layer: protocol (network) 
steganography, 
• Data link layer methods depend on available medium e.g. 
HICCUPS [38] system can be utilized on WLAN links. 
Using such cross-layer steganography has certain 
advantages as it gives more possibilities of exchanging 
hidden data and it is harder to uncover. However, building 
the path with many different steganographic methods may 
introduce delays, therefore some hidden data methods, 
known from the state of the art, may be not sufficient to carry 
network traffic (reminding that in some steganographic 
applications delay is not best measure, because the best one 
is just to be hidden).  
 
STEG ROUTING
MAS PLATFORMS
NETWORK
L1
L2
L3
L4
 
Figure 1. Architecture of TrustMAS 
3.2 TrustMAS architecture 
The proposed architecture of TrustMAS can be described on 
three planes (Fig. 1). In MAS PLATFORMS plane, the gray 
areas represent homogenous MAS platforms, black dots 
represent StegAgents and white ones Ordinary Agents 
involved in TrustMAS. StegAgents act as a distributed 
steganographic router (Steg-Router) as shown on STEG 
ROUTING plane. Connections are possible between 
StegAgents with use of hidden channels, located in various 
network layers (NETWORK plane), and at the platform 
level. As mentioned earlier, what steganographic methods 
will be used to communicate between each StegAgents 
depend on their steg-capabilities. 
The main components that form TrustMAS architecture, 
that will be described, include: SAs and OAs (section 3.1), 
trust and anonymity services (section 3.3) and distributed 
steganographic router (section 3.4). 
 
3.3 Security services in TrustMAS: trust and 
anonymity 
Multi-agent systems give opportunity to build an agents’ 
community. In such environments, like in human society, 
trust and anonymity become important issues as they help 
agents to build and manage their relationships. That is why 
we assume that: 
• There are no typical behaviors of the agents involved in 
the particular MAS community, 
• All agents may exist and live their lives in their own way - 
this assumption results in lack of defining agents’ interests 
and gives no information about characteristics of 
exchanged messages, 
• Because our work is focused on information hiding in 
MAS, we don’t assume that any background traffic exists. 
These assumptions are rather generic and do help to 
describe TrustMAS in theoretical way of building 
steganographic system. In real environment such as IP 
networks background traffic will exist and will aggravate 
detecting of the system.  
Agents must posses certain level of trust for each other, in 
order to minimize the uncertainty of the interactions they 
perform. Moreover agents interactions often have to happen 
in uncertain, dynamically changing and distributed 
environment. Trust, as it is usually describing reliability or 
trustworthiness of the other communication sides, supports 
agents in making right decisions. When trust value is high the 
party with which agent is operating gives more chances to 
succeed e.g. agents need less time to find and achieve their 
goals. On the contrary, when trust value is low, the choice of 
the operating party is more difficult, time-consuming and 
provides less chances for success. In a proposed TrustMAS 
platform we provide trust and anonymity for each agent that 
wishes to join it. Main trust model of TrustMAS platform is 
based on specific behavior of agents – waiting for expected 
scenario and following dialog process mean that agents are 
trusted. Other, not included in this work trust models depend 
mainly on application of TrustMAS and can be changed 
accordingly.  
TrustMAS includes anonymous technique based on 
random-walk algorithm [46] for providing general purpose 
anonymous communication for agents. To send a message 
anonymously the agent sends the message to a randomly 
chosen agent. The message contains a destination address. 
Then, the selected agent flips an asymmetric coin to decide 
whether to forward the massage to the next random agent. 
The coin asymmetry is described by a probability pf. The 
proxy agent forward the message to the next random proxy 
agent with the probability pf and skip forwarding with a 
probability 1 – pf. This probabilistic forwarding assures 
anonymity because any agent can not conclude if messages 
received in this manner are originated from their direct 
sender. 
If many agents join TrustMAS it will be easier to hide 
covert communication exchanged between SAs. All agents 
that take part in proposed MAS platform benefit from trust 
and anonymity that is provided for their interactions. But 
ability of using TrustMAS dictates some conditions: all 
agents that want to use it are obligated to follow certain rules 
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like e.g. forward discovery steganographic messages 
according to random-walk algorithm. This is the “cost” that 
agents have to “pay” in order to benefit from trusted 
environment. 
 
 
Figure 2. Agents Random Walk 
 
3.4 Distributed steganographic router (Steg-router) 
As described in section 3.2 all the StegAgents in TrustMAS 
and their ability to exchange information by using hidden 
channels form distributed steganographic router (Steg-
router). Proposed Steg-router is a new concept of building 
distributed router to carry/convert different covert channels, 
where typically covert channel is end-to-end connection. 
Conversion of hidden channels is performed in 
heterogeneous environment (exp.: hidden information in an 
image converted into hidden information in WLAN) and the 
MAS platform is used here as environment to implement this 
concept. This gives opportunity to evaluate a new 
communication method and explore new potential threats in 
MAS environment. 
The main component of proposed Steg-router is 
steganographic routing protocol (Steg-routing protocol) that 
is described in section 4. It is a distance vector protocol and 
it uses random walk algorithm (mentioned earlier) to perform 
discovery of new StegAgents that join TrustMAS (new SAs 
also perform this algorithm in order to join TrustMAS, to be 
able to find existing SAs). It also utilizes hello mechanism to 
build neighbors’ relations with other SAs and to detect 
changes in their presence. We chose a distance vector routing 
protocol without triggered updates for security reasons - to 
avoid potential attacks connected with monitoring agents 
behavior. We can imagine a situation in which the aim of the 
malicious attack is to observe agents behavior after removing 
random agent from the TrustMAS. If the removed agent was 
StegAgent and if the Steg-routing protocol uses triggered 
updates then suddenly there will be vast activity in the 
TrustMAS, because triggered updates will be send to 
announce changes in the network topology. From the same 
reason distance vector protocol was utilized over the link 
state or hybrid one. Another drawback of the link state 
protocol (or hybrid) for our purposes is that it has greater 
requirements on processing time and memory then distance 
vector and agents may be lacking in both those aspects. 
 
4. Steg-routing protocol 
A typical distance vector routing protocol operates generally 
in the following way: each node sends periodical routing 
updates (its entire route table) to all their neighbors. That is 
why proposed steg-routing protocol will be characterized by 
describing three mechanisms:  
• Discovery and maintenance of the neighbors (section 4.1),  
• Exchanging routing tables (section 4.2), 
• Creating steg-links and steg-paths (section 4.3). 
 
4.1 Discovery of new SAs and maintaining neighbors 
table 
As stated above, all the agents involved in TrustMAS 
perform anonymous exchange based on random-walk 
algorithm. In this procedure each agent uses asymmetric coin 
to decide if it passes data or not to randomly chosen agent 
(StegAgents or other involved in TrustMAS). StegAgents 
uses this procedure to send anonymous message with 
embedded stegmessage that consists of: 
• StegAgent’s address, 
• StegAgent’s steg-capabilities (available steganographic 
methods to use for covert communication). 
 Such mechanism is analogous to sending hello packets to 
the neighbors in classical distance vector protocols, where it 
is responsible for discovery and maintenance of the 
neighbors table. In proposed protocol random walk algorithm 
performs only discovery role. So the discovery phase is 
performed by SAs that are already involved in TrustMAS 
and by new SAs that want to join it. 
Moreover, each StegAgent will maintain two tables: 
neighbors and routing table. Neighbors table is created based 
on the information obtained from random-walk algorithm 
operations. The neighbor relation is formed between two 
StegAgents if there is a steg-link that connects them. 
Maintenance of the actual information in neighbors table is 
achieved by sending, periodically, hello packets through 
formed steg-links (covert channels – connection using 
steganography to next hop SA). Such a solution helps to 
identify the situation when one of the StegAgents becomes 
unavailable. 
So the discovery and maintenance procedure from the new 
StegAgent point of view, that wishes to join TrustMAS, can 
be described in the following steps: 
• Each SA (joining or already involved) uses random walk 
algorithm to discover other SAs in TrustMAS. Fig. 3 
presents the situation, for the case, when new SA tries to 
connect to existing, already interconnected StegAgents, 
• Each agent (SA or OA) passes or drops the discovery 
stegmessage sent based on the random walk algorithm. In 
this way new or existing SAs are learned, 
• Based on the information collected from the first two 
steps, steg-links are formed between new StegAgent and 
found ones if their steg-capabilities match, 
• Two SAs become neighbors if the steg-link exists between 
them. The corresponding entry is added in new SA 
neighbors table, 
• Each SA sends periodically hello packets through 
available steg-links (Fig. 4) to check if the neighbor is still 
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available, 
• If a hello packet is received by SA it refreshes 
corresponding entry in its neighbors table. If the hello 
packet is not received during set period of time it is 
removed from the neighbors table. 
 
 
Figure 3. Discovery mechanism with random walk 
algorithm in TrustMAS for new SA 
 
Outside the platforms connections are learned from fixed 
relations. Collected information helps to form routing tables. 
 
 
Figure 4. Forming steg-links between StegAgents and 
creating neighbors table 
4.2 Exchanging routing information  
TrustMAS uses steganographic channels to exchange routing 
tables between StegAgents. These routing updates are sent 
also at regular intervals to finally achieve proactive hidden 
routing. Routing proactivity provides unlinkability of the 
steganographic connections and discovery process. This 
procedure as well as further hidden communication is 
cryptographically independent. 
To show how the routing information is exchanged we will 
continue the scenario from the section 4.1, where the new SA 
joins TrustMAS. After the discovery phase, when the new 
SA’s neighbors table possesses actual information it receives 
entire routing tables from its neighboring StegAgents (Fig. 
5).  
 
 
Figure 5. Exchanging routing information between SAs 
 
Then the routing information is exchanged periodically 
between SAs. When new SA receives the routing tables from 
its neighbors it is able to learn about other distance SAs and 
how to reach them. Based on this information it can also 
form new steg-links with other SAs (Fig. 6). 
 
Figure 6. New StegAgent learns about other SAs n 
TrustMAS 
If one of the SAs becomes unavailable, the change is 
detected with the hello mechanism. Then routing table is 
updated and the change is sent to all the neighbors in the 
neighbors table, when there is time (periodic) to send the 
entire routing table. 
Each routing entry in the routing table represents best 
available steg-path to distance StegAgent with its metric. The 
metric is based on: 
• Available capacity of the steg-links along the end-to-end 
steg-path, 
• Introduced delays along the steg-path, 
• Available steganographic methods – for security reasons 
some steganography methods may be preferred then others 
(e.g. because they are more immune to steganalisys). 
The algorithm of StegAgent hidden routing protocol (Steg-
routing) can be also expressed in the following pseudo code: 
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Algorithm 1 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
(11) 
(12) 
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
(16) 
(17) 
(18) 
(19) 
(20) 
(21) 
(22) 
(23) 
(24) 
(25) 
(26) 
(27) 
(28) 
(29) 
(30) 
(31) 
(32) 
(33) 
(34) 
(35) 
(36) 
(37) 
(38) 
(39) 
(40) 
(41) 
(42) 
(43) 
(44) 
(45) 
(46) 
(47) 
(48) 
(49) 
(50) 
(51) 
(52) 
(53) 
(54) 
(55) 
(56) 
(57) 
(58) 
(59) 
(60) 
(61) 
(62) 
(63) 
(64) 
(65) 
(66) 
randomWalkRequest ← listenMAS() 
routingUpdateRequest ← listenNETWORK() 
hello ← listenNETWORK() 
do  
{  
 if (randomWalkPeriod + random(fluctuationRW) 
exceeded)  
  sendRandomWalk(myAddress, myCovertChannels) 
 if (routingUpdatePeriod + random(fluctuationRU) 
exceeded)  
  sendRoutingUpdate(myRoutingTable) 
 if (helloPeriod + random(fluctuationH) exceeded)  
  sendHello(myNeighboursTable) 
 if (randomWalkRequest) 
 { 
  if (findStegMsg(randomWalkRequest)) 
  { 
   foundAddress, foundCovertChannels ←     
uncover(randomWalkRequest) 
   if (isNewEntry(foundAddress, 
foundCovertChannels)) 
   { 
    myRoutingTable ←  
     updateMyRoutes(foundAddress, 
foundCovertChannels) 
    sendRoutingUpdate(myRoutingTable) 
   } 
  }  
  forwardRandomWalk(randomWalkRequest) 
 } 
 if (routingUpdateRequest and 
findChanges(routingUpdateRequest)) 
 { 
  myRoutingTable ← 
   updateMyRoutes(routingUpdateRequest) 
  sendRoutingUpdate(myRoutingTable) 
 } 
 if (hello) 
 { 
  myRoutingTable ← 
   updateNeighborLastHelloTime(hello) 
 } 
 for each neighbor ← entry(myNeighborTable)  
 if(helloTimeout(neighbor) exceeded) 
 { 
  myNeighborTable ← 
   removeEntry(neighbor) 
  sendRoutingUpdate(myRoutingTable) 
 } 
}while (∞) 
 
subroutine sendRandomWalk(address, channels) 
{ 
 destination ← selectRandomAgent(myPlatform) 
 sendViaMAS(destination, cover(address, 
channels)) 
} 
 
subroutine forwardRandomWalk(message) 
{ 
 if (coinFlip(pf) = heads) 
 { 
  destination ← selectRandomAgent(myPlatform) 
  sendViaMAS(destination, message) 
 } 
} 
(67) 
(68) 
(69) 
(70) 
(71) 
(72) 
 
subroutine sendRoutingUpdate(table) 
{ 
 for each destination ← entry(myNeighborTable)  
  sendViaNETWORK(destination, cover(table)) 
} 
 
4.3 Additional improvements to limit convergence 
time 
If the steg-routing protocol operates like described in 
sections 4.1 and 4.2 the following scenario may occur: new 
StegAgent uses random walk algorithm and discovers two 
existing SAs (SA1 and SA2 - Fig. 7). 
 
  
Figure 7.  Scenario: new StegAgent discovers two SAs but 
can not communicate with them due to steg-capabilities 
incompatibility 
  
Figure 8. Mechanism for improving convergence that 
enables other SAs to form a steg-link with new SA that 
shares the same steg-capabilities 
 
Unfortunately both StegAgents: SA1 and SA2 posses steg-
capabilities that are not compatible with new StegAgent ones. 
That means that it is unable to exchange either hello packets 
nor routing tables, because the steg-links are not formed. In 
this case the following mechanism can be utilized to improve 
 7 
convergence as showed in Fig 8. 
The main idea of this mechanism is as follows: if existing 
SA is discovered by new SA that was not yet known and their 
steg-capabilities are incompatible (like New SA and SA1 in 
Fig. 8) it sends “form steg-link” message (marked as 1, F 
message in Fig. 8) to one of its neighbors that shares the 
same steganographic methods as new SA (it can choose this 
neighbor by inspecting its routing table where the steg-
capabilities are also stored). Such message (form steg-link) 
must contain an address of new SA (SA_address) and its 
steg-capabilities (SA_steg_capabilities) and can be formed 
as: 
form steg-link SA_address SA_steg_capabilities 
 
In Fig. 8 SA1 sends “form steg-link” message to SA3, 
because it knows that SA3 possess compatible steg-
capabilities with joining SA. When StegAgent SA3 receives 
this message it send the hello packet to the new SA to form a 
neighbor relation and to form a steg-link. Then the routing 
table is exchanged and new SA learns about other SAs in the 
TrustMAS. 
 
4.4 Creating steg-links and steg-paths 
The end-to-end connection between two distant StegAgents 
is called steg-path. Every steg-path is created based on 
available steg-links. The algorithm of forming a steg-path 
uses metrics that are set for each steg-link. Routing metrics in 
TrustMAS are calculated based on the steganography 
methods, its capacity and introduced delays.  
If two hops are available, the steg-link is chosen to the 
path, if it possesses higher capacity value, introduce less 
delay and uses more preferred steganographic method. Also 
there is a situation possible that on one steg-link two or more 
steganographic methods are available. In this case metrics are 
calculated for each steganographic method and the best is 
chosen (Fig. 9).  
Each SA is also responsible, if it is necessary, for 
converting steganographic channels according to the next 
hop SA steg-capabilities. In this way a steganographic router 
functionality is provided. 
The algorithm that each StegAgent uses to choose steg-
path can be expressed in the following pseudo code: 
 
Algorithm 2  
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
(11) 
(12) 
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
 if (newDataToSend) 
   { 
     paths ← findPathsMatch(myRoutingTable, 
destination) 
     if (count(paths) > 1) 
     { 
       calcMetricsForPaths(paths, capacity, delay, 
steg_method) 
       BPath ← chooseBestPath(paths) 
       sendData(BPath) 
     } 
     else 
       if (count(paths) = 1) sendData(paths) 
       else noPathFound() 
   }  
 
 
Figure 9. Example of SAs with their available steg-links 
and calculated metrics 
 
Created and maintained routing table enables StegAgent to 
send data via hidden channels, where metrics are calculated 
based on the available steganographic methods. 
 
Figure 10. Example of forming steg-path based on 
available steg-links 
 
Fig. 10 shows how an example end-to-end steg-path is 
formed based on exemplary steganographic methods. As 
mentioned earlier each steg-path consist of certain number of 
the steg-links (connection to next hop SA; steg-link is e.g. 
between SA A and SA B in Fig. 10).  
5. Conclusion and future work 
We have presented concept of a distributed steganographic 
router that provides ability to create the covert channels 
between chosen agents. Paths between agents can be built 
with the use of any of the steganographic methods in any 
network layer and be adjusted to the heterogeneous 
characteristics of a given network.  
 
Future work will cover performance analysis of the proposed 
steganographic routing, its convergence time, available 
range, and potential limitations.   
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